Behavioral Political Agency

Scientific Responsible: EDOARDO GRILLO

Project objectives:  Standard models of political economy postulate that voters have well defined preferences and can keep politicians accountable for their behavior. For instance, they reelect politicians that act in their interests and dismiss politicians who do not. Extensive evidence suggests that this is not always the case. Voters are often prone to behavioral and cognitive biases that make them swayable in favor of some policies or platforms. Politicians are aware of this and take advantage of it. In this project, I will study settings where politicians leverage on voters’ biases to weaken electoral accountability. In particular, I will investigate the strategies used by politicians to modify voters’ preferences and beliefs, and the impact that these strategies have on electoral accountability and, ultimately, the long-run development of countries. As a result of my analysis, I will also be able to suggests interventions to make economies and polities more resilient against these strategies by politicians.

Grantor: MUR - FIS (Fondo Italiano per la Scienza)

Duration: 14/03/2024 - 13/03/2027

dSEA staff involved:

• Edoardo Grillo