
Seminar by Helios Herrera
SALA SEMINARI – 1° PIANO, PALAZZO LEVI CASES, VIA DEL SANTO 33 - ORE 12.30
11.09.2018
Seminar by Helios Herrera, University of Warwick
Title: “Fake Persuasion”, co-authored by Kobi Gazer and Motty Perry.
Abstract
We propose a dynamic model of fake ratings. The public receives a continuous signal/ message/review every period and is aware that each review can be true, i.e. correlated with the state, or fake, i.e. entirely fabricated. The fake reviewer/sender(s) tries to move the public's prior to one side as much as possible. In equilibrium, regardless of the environment, the fake sender uses the same (mixed) strategy every period, namely a continuous distribution over an interval containing the extreme. While fake persuasion works, asymptotically correct information aggregation is achieved, albeit at a slower pace.